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Mon Apr 10 18:35:08 2006
Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty-Year Pilgrimage

MILLIE R. CREIGHTON

Ever since Ruth Benedict applied the terms "guilt culture" and "shame culture" to explain what she perceived as a fundamental contrast in the psychological makeup of Japanese and Americans, the applicability of the guilt-versus-shame dichotomy has been a controversial and much-debated topic both with relation to the study of Japanese culture and with regard to its relevance for the anthropological study of culture in general. From the time the first Japanese translation of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was published in 1948 (Benedict 1948), many Japanese have reacted strongly against being labeled a "shame culture" and have interpreted Benedict's work as a pejorative account of their culture written by an outsider asserting the superiority of Western traditions. Many Westerners have also viewed Benedict's juxtaposition of "shame" and "guilt" cultures as, at best, irrelevant to contemporary Japanese and, at worst, as ethnocentric chauvinism. For over 40 years Benedict's interpretations have been repeatedly denounced, denied, refuted, and reclassified, but the issue is certainly not dead.

While conducting research in Japan I readily perceived that many Japanese dislike being thought of as members of a "shame"

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culture. When people in Japan found out I was an anthropologist, a frequent comment—in rather subdued tones following a pause—was, “Oh-h, like Ruth Benedict?” Somehow on these occasions, I always felt the need to account for myself. I once discussed Benedict’s book with a young neurosurgeon in Japan. When I asked him what he thought of her interpretations he lingered, then answered, “Well it’s very hard for me to say, you see I am Japanese and so I don’t like to say I agree with her, but in truth I think she was really right.” I also once discussed whether concepts of relative worth entered Benedict’s analysis with an American woman who insisted that they had. I soon learned that she had never actually read The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, but she pointed out that Benedict’s book was, after all, “a study of Japanese behavior done by an American right after the war.” At times like these I wonder if we are really responding to what Benedict thought and wrote or only to what she is reputed to have meant.

This paper focuses on the contributions of Ruth Benedict and on the analytic use of shame and guilt distinctions, but on another level it deals with concerns pertinent to the very nature of anthropological inquiry. I address these concerns in the following three ways. First, I consider what I believe Benedict intended when she made her assertions, and contrast this with how her work is often perceived. Since there are problems with Benedict’s analytic definitions of shame and guilt, my second concern is to present another model for differentiating shame and guilt. Finally, I discuss the applicability of this model for the interpretive study of culture through a comparison of Japan and the United States. I believe a cultural emphasis on either shame or guilt is meaningful because it may be consistent with other cultural values and patterns of behavior. I also perceive Japanese society as integrated more by shame than by guilt. A hypothesis I wish to explore is that the Japanese world view and low cultural value given to individualism is related to the effectiveness and predominance of shame as a behavioral sanction.

IN DEFENSE OF “RUTHLESS BENEDICT”

The strong Japanese reaction against being designated a shame culture by Benedict stemmed in part from the belief that Westerners viewed guilt as belonging to a higher level of moral development than shame and hence considered cultures integrated by guilt sanc-
tions to be superior to those integrated by shame sanctions. Benedict herself was widely condemned for presumably allowing “value judgements to creep into her ideas” (Doi 1973:48) and for failing to perceive either guilt in Japanese society or shame in American society. Distinguishing between public and private shame, the Japanese social scholar, Sakuta, asked, “Is it proper to characterize Japanese culture by public shame? It seems to me that in Western cultures as well public shame also has a strong regulatory force” (Sakuta 1967:12). Lebra, who agrees that Japan is a highly shame-conscious culture—something she attributes to the cultural emphasis on maintaining particular status roles within groups—cautiously points out that “this is not to endorse Benedict’s view of Japan as a ‘shame culture,’ for there is much guilt as well” (Lebra 1976:79). The Japanese psychiatrist Doi also concurs with Benedict that Japan is a shame culture, conceding that “in characterizing Japanese culture as a culture of shame she has pointed out something extremely important” (Doi 1973:48). However, Doi condemns Benedict for her supposed inability to recognize the guilt also present in Japanese society. He claims that Benedict “seems to postulate guilt and shame as entirely unrelated to each other” (Doi 1973:48) and that her failure to perceive Japanese guilt “can only be attributed to her cultural prejudices” (Doi 1973:50). Dramer claims that Benedict’s distinction between guilt cultures and shame cultures is interculturally inapplicable, “due to cultural biases in her theoretical framework” (Dramer 1981:8).

In general I find these objections to Benedict unwarranted. Had she failed to recognize the presence of guilt in Japanese society she would not have claimed that the Japanese “are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of their misstep” (Benedict 1946:2, 3). Doi makes the damning assertion that “The reader of Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword might, incidentally, have the impression that the sense of shame was almost a Japanese monopoly and unknown in the West” (Doi 1973:53). However, Benedict tells those readers that individuals even in guilt cultures such as “in the United States, suffer in addition from shame” (Benedict 1946:222). Benedict does not argue that guilt is absent in Japanese culture, that shame is lacking among Americans, nor that guilt and shame are unrelated to each other. What she does
argue, and it is an opinion supported by Japanese scholars such as Sakuta (1967, 1972), Hamaguchi (1982), and Doi (1973), is that shame sanctions play a greater role in regulating behavior in Japan than guilt sanctions. Benedict writes:

Japanese sometimes react as strongly as any Puritan to a private accumulation of guilt. But their extreme statements nevertheless point out correctly where the emphasis falls in Japan. It falls on the importance of shame rather than on the importance of guilt. [Benedict 1946:222]

The one area in which it is valid to severely criticize Benedict involves her designation of shame cultures as relying on external sanctions of control while guilt cultures rely on internal sanctions of control. Sakuta (1972) raised the argument that people first learn what is guilt or sin by receiving punishment from the outside, and that “a person who knows shame” in the Japanese sense will control himself by himself. Mori Mikisaburo (1971) also argued that in traditional Japanese thought guilt is associated with an external threat of punishment while shame comes from the internal consciousness of ethic nurtured through custom and etiquette. These Japanese scholars effectively reverse Benedict’s definitions of internality and externality.

The internal/external criterion cannot be used to distinguish guilt from shame, since at some point in the developmental process both are internalized. Although Benedict is wrong on this point I do not believe she is trying to assert a value judgment regarding the relative validity of shame versus guilt, or internal-versus-external sanctions. Those Japanese who felt that Westerners in general ranked guilt sanctions superior to shame sanctions were probably correct. However, Benedict herself was trying to argue that it was invalid for Westerners to make such value judgments. She warns, “No foreigner can decree, for a people who have not his habits and assumptions, a manner of life after his own image” (Benedict 1946:314). Instead of proffering the personal value judgment that guilt is somehow better than shame, Benedict argues that, although the tendency toward one or the other may be unavoidable, the extreme overreliance on one at the expense of the other is detrimental to the individual psyche and to the maintenance of cultural integration. It is relevant to note that the evidence she cites for this involves the psychological problems suffered by Americans, not Japanese, because of an overreliance on guilt, not shame. She claims that “all psychi-
atrists know what trouble contemporary Americans have with their consciences” (Benedict 1946:223).

It is not valid to attribute the inadequacies in Benedict’s definitions of shame and guilt to her own Western value judgments creeping into her analysis of Japanese society, nor to accuse her of culturally biased intentions. If we are trying to discern intentions, the discussion of shame and guilt presented in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* seems to have been intended as an affirmation of Gorer’s work. Gorer was a scholar who greatly influenced Benedict, and one whom she cites. For those who would attribute culturally biased value assessments to the relative worth of guilt and shame, Gorer offers the following advice.

As human animals, all men everywhere have the same basic needs; but as members of society they differ greatly in the value they put on different goals. If we can afford the respect to pride and shame that we demand for conscience the world will be an easier, and a safer, place to live in. [Gorer 1966:98]

With the attention focused on Benedict’s misuse of internal and external sanctions, the value judgments once associated with the developmental sequence of shame and guilt have been neglected despite the fact that these were far more ethnocentric, far more condemnatory, and had far greater impact on anthropological and psychological theory. Reading Doi, one might almost get the idea that shame is superior to guilt because it develops first and is hence a more fundamental emotion. In Western academic thought in the early 1900s, which was heavily influenced by “progressivism” and social-Darwinism, the reasoning was the reverse. Early anthropologists such as Tylor, Morgan, Hobhouse, and Spencer promoted the progressive school of thought, which held that cultures could be placed along a value-ranked continuum. Parallels were drawn between biological evolution, psychological development, and this cultural ranking. It was believed that species progressed from simple to more highly complex forms, that the human individual progressed from the newborn dependent state to adult mastery, and that cultures progressed from undeveloped and savage to advanced and civilized. This school of thought had its influence on psychology, resulting in the equation of “children, savages, and neurotics.” A classic example of the use of this analytic equation is found in Freud’s *Totem and Taboo* (1918), where childhood behavior is used to illuminate the behavior of savages and neurotics, while neurotics
and savages are used to explain each other. In this early framework, guilt, beginning at a later stage of human development than shame, would be seen as more advanced and therefore better. Shame, originating earlier, would be viewed as more childish and hence, by extrapolation, more savage and neurotic. It certainly might be considered "pejorative" to be labeled a shame culture under these terms.¹

I do not believe, however, that these were the terms under which Benedict designated Japan as a "shame culture." It has been argued that, by allowing her culturally biased value assessments of the relative value of guilt and shame to creep into her analysis of Japan, Benedict was guilty of violating the central tenet of anthropological research, cultural relativism—the idea that each culture has a unity, coherence, and history of its own and therefore has to be appreciated for its own cultural configuration rather than assessed according to the values of another culture. Many writers reproach Benedict for her lack of cultural relativism while using her as a standard of bigotry. Reviewing a comparative analysis of Japanese and Jews by BenDasan (1970), this Japanese critic applauds BenDasan's "relativism" in contrast to Benedict's ethnocentrism.²

Benedict characterized Japanese culture as a shame culture in contrast to the guilt cultures of the West, certainly at that time she was deeply-laden with a consciousness of Western superiority and looked down on the Japanese. . . . BenDasan's book not only understands the Japanese culture better, it does not look down on the Japanese. He keeps the attitude of relativism. [Takeuchi 1971]

I would like to point out that the very concept of cultural relativism was introduced to the discipline of anthropology by Franz Boas and certain of his students, one of whom was Ruth Benedict. The cultural relativists fought to eliminate the influence of social evolutionists and progressivists from anthropological doctrine, arguing that neither cultures nor individual stages of development could be ranked. In keeping with the cultural-relativist tradition, Benedict was one of the initiators of the humanist impulse within anthropology that called for a sensitive awareness of the meaning of culture in the human experience. She applied her findings among Indian groups to urge for a greater tolerance of various life-styles within American culture (Voget 1975:368, 369). Whatever shortcomings exist in the analytic conceptions she uses to discuss shame and guilt in Japanese society, it seems ironic, unfortunate, and unjust that it is Benedict who has been called upon to bear her own mark of shame.
for presumably espousing the ethnocentrism she dedicated her professional career to eradicating from anthropological thought.\textsuperscript{3}

CONSTRUCTING A MODEL FOR SHAME AND GUILT

The external/internal distinction used by Benedict becomes particularly confusing if we consider her idea that shame requires an audience, whether it be real or fantasied (Benedict 1946:223, 224). If shame does not require that an observer be present physically but only in the individual’s imagination, has not the fear of being shamed in effect been internalized? If not, we would have to reconsider whether guilt feelings can arise from transgressing the laws of God—something Benedict sees as a major aspect of guilt in the West. In David’s psalms we hear that God’s omniscience makes God inescapable.

Where can I escape from thy spirit?
Where can I flee from thy presence?
If I climb up to heaven thou art there;
If I make my bed in hell, again I find thee.
If I take my flight to the frontiers of the morning
or dwell at the limit of the Western Sea,
even there thy hand will meet me
and thy right hand will hold me fast.

[Psalms 139:7–10]

If the criterion for shame is that it requires an audience, either real or imagined, then guilt based on sin can be subsumed under shame—as shame before this inescapable, omniscient God. From this discussion it seems clear that the question of internalization cannot be used to define shame and guilt.

This paper utilizes concepts developed from psychoanalytic and cognitive developmental theory (Eidelson 1968; Milrod 1982; Piers and Singer 1967; etc.) to differentiate between shame and guilt in the following ways. Shame involves the awareness of inadequacy or failure to achieve a wished-for self-image which is accompanied by, or originally arises from, the fear of separation and abandonment. The development of shame precedes the development of guilt and “is in fact one of its important precursors” (Milrod 1982:99). Thus Doi claims, “one might also say that the sense of shame lies deeper than the sense of sin and guilt” (Doi 1973:55). Shame begins early in infancy during what is referred to as the pre-oedipal phase. Dur-
ing this phase the developmental task required of the human infant is the task of bonding to the mother or primary care-giver. The anxiety associated with shame arises from the fear of separation or loss of the loving parent. Capturing the essence of shame, the theologian Bonhoeffer writes, “Shame is man’s ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to unity with the origin. . . . Shame is more original than remorse” (quoted in Doi 1973:55).

Shame feelings precede the development of the superego, although they may later be integrated into the superego formation. Guilt develops later during the oedipal phase and requires the presence of a superego. The developmental tasks of this stage are separating from the mother, becoming autonomous, and developing a sense of identity or “the awareness of being a person separate and distinct from all others” (Eidelberg 1968:399). Feelings of guilt are generated whenever the boundaries of negative behavior, as established by the superego, are touched or transgressed. The unconscious threat in guilt anxiety is not abandonment but punishment or retribution.

Initially guilt is associated with the fear that committing a negative act will result in punishment being meted out by the parent. Later this fear is internalized, so that guilt feelings result whether there is an actual threat of punishment or not. In effect, the anxiety created by the superego automatically “punishes” the wrongdoer for transgressing or approaching a negative pole. Likewise, shame begins with the real fear that the perception of inadequacy will result in the loss of parental love. Later this may also be internalized such that anxiety caused by the failure to live up to one’s wished-for self-image reflects a past threat of losing parental love, or the present threat that one may lose the superego’s love.

It is important to differentiate between apparent external manifestations of either sanction and true shame or guilt. Either sanction may involve feelings aroused in the physical presence of an audience, or when there is a fear that an action may become known to an audience. In the case of shame this involves the real or expected threat that the distance between one’s actual and idealized state is perceived by others and will result in one’s being placed in an inferior position within the membership group. For guilt this occurs when an individual’s deviation from group standards comes to the attention of group members, usually resulting in punishment.
For true shame or guilt to be experienced, these feelings must be internalized. True guilt must be accompanied by the individual’s internal recognition of transgressing the superego. If not, the individual only fears the consequences of an act and does not feel the tension of guilt in the true sense. Shame must also involve a corresponding internal feeling in the individual that the inadequacy perceived by others is valid. If not, the resulting emotion is more likely to be fear, embarrassment, indifference, frustration, or anger, rather than true shame.

Some authors have questioned the assertion that shame corresponds with failure to meet ego-ideals while guilt results from the transgressions of negative limits. DeVos believes that the Western ethical biases underlying psychoanalysis (DeVos 1973:163) precluded Westerners from recognizing “specific Japanese patterns of guilt” (DeVos 1973:147) resulting from the failure to achieve positive goals. He argues that guilt in the Japanese is essentially related either to an impulse to hurt . . . or to the realization of having injured a love object . . . . If a parent has instilled in a child an understanding of his capacity to hurt by failing to carry out an obligation expected of him as a member of a family, any such failure can make him feel extremely guilty. [DeVos 1973:148]

Certainly, it is true that cultural biases have influenced psychoanalytic theory, which correspondingly tends to emphasize superego development, personal individuation, and the assertion of personal autonomy.4 However, many Japanese scholars have voiced agreement with the distinctions between shame and guilt established by Piers and Singer, while rejecting Western standards of individualism. For example, Hamaguchi also describes shame as the force channeling human beings toward “elevation.” He writes:

human beings try to use the feeling of “shame” even if it is uncomfortable, as a means of elevating themselves, or as a means of guidance in life. Therefore, shame [hagi] can be said to be a consciousness [ishiki] acting as a type of morality. That’s the reason human beings are said to be animals that know shame. [Hamaguchi 1982:58]

Sakuta’s primary criticism of Benedict was that she had an inadequate concept of Japanese shame.5 Sakuta distinguished between three types of shame: public shame (corresponding to the fear of losing face before others), private shame (involving the internalization of this code), and another form of internal shame which he called
shuchi. According to Sakuta, shuchi arises in circumstances when people cause harm to a group member or to others they have relied on (Sakuta 1967). It seems likely that certain cases defined by DeVos as “guilt” would in Sakuta’s framework be considered shuchi and, therefore, it is premature to conclude that DeVos’s findings have completely invalidated the framework given by Piers and Singer.  

Particular cases of shame and guilt often present seeming incongruities, but further inspection shows that they do conform to this analytic framework. One such apparent contradiction involves the effects of shame and guilt on concentration camp survivors. Grubrich-Simitis contends that for the survivors:

above all, life was overshadowed by the most severe feelings of guilt and shame for having survived at all, for having endured the humiliations and degradations, and for having tolerated the abandonment of previous super-ego and self-ideal demands. [Grubrich-Simitis 1981:424]

The problem here is determining why shame and guilt feelings should be so severe among members of the victimized group.

The causes of shame are somewhat easier to isolate. The wished-for self-image, which the individual may have been able to maintain in his or her ordinary life, was made unattainable by the conditions of incarceration. Although temporarily abandoned, these self-ideal demands remained as a mark of individual inadequacy. The circumstances of victimization also led to the development of shame on a more fundamental level. When as adults we are helplessly exposed to external events over which we have no control, it exposes the illusory nature of our belief in the efficacy of the “self.” This involves the recognition of an extreme distance from our ordinary ego-ideal, a distance not perceived in the usual course of events.

It is a bit more difficult to assess why the survivors should be plagued by guilt. The clue provided by the researcher is that in order to survive, previous superego demands had to be abandoned during the incarceration period. Upon release, the very fact of survival was experienced as a verdict of guilt. Life, for the survivors, symbolized identification with the aggressor and a willingness to commit what they now defined as contemptuous acts in order to survive.

One aspect of guilt involved the perception of survival as good fortune in contrast to the death of others. In her diary, Anne Frank writes of her friend Lies, with whom she had fought and whom she
now believes may be dead. Realizing that the fate she imagines for her friend could have been her own, she is overcome by guilt. Anne’s guilt arises because she believes she has been selfish and ungrateful considering her good fortune relative to Lies. Thinking of this female friend, Anne suddenly feels guilty about her recent fury with her mother (Frank 1982:100, 101).

Anne’s guilt over her adolescent hostilities toward her mother helps explain another apparent contradiction, which is why people tend to feel guilt at the death of a parent. Parental death does not result from any transgression by the child and so one might expect that shame would be the more prevalent emotion. As Anne’s case shows, however, during the parent’s lifetime a child experiences hostile or aggressive feelings for the parent that conflict with the love and gratitude generated toward the parent. Hostile feelings may be particularly strong in relation to the perception of the parent as the obstacle preventing one from attaining adult status or sexual gratification. Parental death is the symbolic realization of these hostile wishes. A child feels guilt for previous aggressive or hostile desires as well as for any former conduct that had hurt the parent.

Another concept that helps explain why guilt is so frequently experienced at the death of a parent involves what Modell calls “separation guilt” (Modell 1965:328). Separation guilt originally develops in the context of the close mother/child relationship. As the child begins to separate from the mother it may feel that its own increasing autonomy “hurts” the mother, who is no longer as greatly needed by the child. Separation is symbolically perceived as causing the death of the mother. The actual death of a parent can arouse a reactivation of these early feelings, creating a sense of guilt that may be extreme.

DeVos persuasively argues that achievement among the Japanese is highly motivated by guilt resulting from parental death. In the context of the above discussion I would suggest that this is not necessarily “a specifically Japanese pattern of guilt” (DeVos 1973:147), but rather that the emphasis between the two patterns of guilt experienced at parental death varies between Japanese and Westerners. I suggest the possibility that the Western response is more likely to result from a subconscious perception of the death as a symbolic killing of the parent, whereas the Japanese response conforms to separation guilt. DeVos describes the Japanese experience at the
death of a parent as "the symbolic culmination of the parent's being hurt following some bad conduct of the child" (DeVos 1973:153), a definition that corresponds well with Modell's description of separation guilt. The prevalence of the two types of guilt is logically consistent with other cultural emphases. In Western cultures, childhood attempts at separation are more likely to be applauded as steps toward independence rather than seen as "hurting" the parent. The Western emphasis on total individuation ultimately suggests the elimination of the parent, and parental death symbolically represents the culmination of subconscious desires to destroy the parent. In contrast, separation guilt is likely to be extreme among the Japanese, where the cultural emphasis is on bonding, and where childhood attempts at independence or separation are discouraged and portrayed as "hurting" the parent. Parental death is the symbolic culmination of hurting parents through separation from them or deviation from their wishes.

Piers has asserted that "Both shame and guilt are highly important mechanisms to insure socialization of the individual" (Piers and Singer 1967:36). I would suggest that there is a large viable range of varying emphasis between these two sanctions and that in general the alignment of a culture within this range is related to other aspects of the culture into which a person is being socialized. This range can be diagrammed on two poles, one for shame and one for guilt, with each culture receiving an independent variable for each type of affect. (See Figure 1.) An absolute absence of shame or guilt is located at an undefined point at the low-shame or low-guilt end of each respective pole. If a culture falls outside of the viable range, there will be pressure for adaptation. For example, both Benedict (1946) and Riesman (1950) suggest that such an adaptive shift has resulted in a decreased emphasis on Puritan guilt in the United States and an increased emphasis on shame.

The shaded areas of Figure 1 signify an adaptive range for shame and guilt. The nonshaded areas external to the circle indicate either excessively high levels of shame or guilt, or extremely low levels of shame or guilt. The axis labeled "symmetry" represents an equivalence or near equivalence of shame and guilt, while the axis labeled "disjunction" represents an overreliance on one form of sanction. Any of these circumstances may result in a shift toward the shaded range. This need not mean that mysterious forces are operating to
keep the human psyche in an acceptable range. Cultural solutions
can result from human beings reflecting on their situation, perceiv-
ing a problem, and making choices for change. Keesing asserts that
such choices "are a major mechanism of long-run sociocultural
change and of adaptive response" (Keesing 1981:167). This may
apply to internal psychological states as well as to material condi-
tions.

I am not trying to pinpoint Japan, the United States, or any other
culture on this diagram. I only use it to help illustrate some impor-
tant points about the nature of shame and guilt within cultures. The
first is that it appears that some degree of guilt and shame are es-
sential. Because they function as mechanisms of social control it is
unlikely that any society could be maintained without them. Piers
points out that although many Utopian authors have tried to project societies that are neither guilt-creating nor shame-producing, no attempt to build such a society has ever been realized (Piers and Singer 1967:37). However, some groups may survive with very low levels of guilt or shame, while others require much higher levels.

As well as creating social cohesion, some degree of shame and guilt may be beneficial for the individual psyche. The Spanish writer Baroja writes that "'Shame' as the sages said, 'is the sign of timidity, which is born of true love' " (Schneider 1977:21). Eric Heller claims that "the very capacity for experiencing shame, the design of shame inscribed in the human soul, . . . is a sine qua non of humanity" (Schneider 1977:xiii). Shame is seen as desirable by both authors because it requires struggling toward an ideal for the sake of maintaining a valued relationship. Some degree of guilt is necessary because it acts as a restraint against undesirable actions. If both shame and guilt are essential to some degree, it seems unlikely that an incredible disjunction between the two would be optimal.

Extreme levels of guilt and shame are also maladaptive. At very extreme levels depression, neuroses, or immobility may result. Risen analyzes a case of anorexia nervosa as attributable to a shame-driven, guilt-ridden personality (Risen 1982). Nietzsche describes the consequences of extreme intolerable shame.

"For what does one have to atone most? For one's modesty; for having failed to listen to one's most personal requirements; for having mistaken oneself; for having underestimated oneself. . . . This lack of reverence for oneself revenges itself through every kind of deprivation: health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, firmness, courage." [translated in Schneider 1977:xvii]

The guilt-ridden person is incapacitated and rendered unable to reach his potential. According to Piers:

The meaning of self-depreciation in a guilt "complex" has been frequently described; it is self-punishment to buy off the Superego. . . . The guilt-ridden person is held back, becomes constricted in his character, his earlier and subsequent identifications tend to be unconstructive images, inactivity, passivity or turning against the self are his fate. [Piers and Singer 1967:25, 28]

Just as extreme disjunction between guilt and shame creates problems in the individual psyche, an absolute symmetry between them also appears intolerable. Various forms of neurotic behavior have been attributed to an equivalence of guilt and shame sanctions that leaves individuals "floundering between the horns of two powerful
anxieties and wavering in their choice of defense and behavior” (Piers and Singer 1967:20). A conceptual analogy to explain the asymmetrical balance between shame and guilt likely in an individual (or culture) may be drawn from right- or left-hand dominance. It is preferable to have two hands than none, preferable to have two hands than one. Having some dexterity in both is optimal. However, most of us are right-handed or left-handed and the truly ambidextrous person is exceptionally rare. Finally, it is inappropriate to think of either left- or right-handedness as superior to the other.

APPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL INTERPRETATION: THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN CONTRAST

If absolute symmetry is not optimal it seems likely that one type of sanction will be at least slightly emphasized in most cultures. What is significant is the possibility that cultural variation in the relative presence of these sanctions may correspond to different assumptions about the nature of society and human relations. In other words, individual moral development may be associated with wider social processes. Such a correspondence would not be surprising, since guilt and shame sanctions are part of a person’s internal mechanisms of self-control, whereas systems of leadership and conflict resolution constitute societal mechanisms of social control. It has been suggested that the human psyche needs to establish cohesion between these two realms. According to Edwards:

Human intelligence strives for a match between interior mental structures and the organization of information in the environment. In the case of moral development, this would mean that human intelligence strives for a fit between most-used modes of moral judgement and the information about human nature and conflict resolution embodied in the social structure. [Edwards 1981:522]

I would also suggest that this is a dialectical process. Culture involves a complicated network of interrelated elements. Once certain cultural “rules” or patterns are established, other elements become tenable if they are consistent with these. In this sense, it may be said that the culture creates “pressure” for a parallel development in the individual personality to achieve a match between the organization of information that exists in the social environment and the interior mental structures of its participants. I believe Japanese society is integrated more by shame and that this form of integration is consistent with prevailing child-rearing practices, the basic philosoph-
ical view of human nature, and, in particular, the cultural value placed on group-oriented behavior as opposed to independence and individuality.

**INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND THE "SELF"**

A person’s "self-concept" can vary considerably across cultures. There are indications that the demarcation of "self" is dramatically different for Japanese and Americans. The Euro-American tradition defines an individual as an independent being and the autonomous unit of action within a social group. In contrast to the Western "individual," Hamaguchi designates the Japanese social actor as a "contextual." The self-concept of a Japanese "contextual" cannot be said to equal the group to which he or she belongs, but it includes the context of relevant social relationships. For this reason, Hamaguchi claims, "contextuals treat interpersonal relations as a part of oneself" rather than as something outside of the boundaries of "self" (Hamaguchi 1985:314). For the contextual, "a sense of identification with others (sometimes including conflict) pre-exists and self-ness is confirmed only through interpersonal relationships." 7

In Japan, high cultural value is placed on group-oriented behavior as opposed to the Western ideal of individualism and self-reliance. According to Nakane, "the Japanese ethics puts high value on the harmonious integration (wa) of group members" (Nakane 1970:49). The group orientation of the Japanese is so strong that even their sense of individual self-identity may not be as rigidly defined as it is for Americans. The Japanese word for "myself" is jibun, literally meaning "my part" of some larger whole. Mori Joji (1977) characterized the Japanese personality as a "shell-less egg," having an awareness of a sense of self defined by the soft fluid outer membrane but not the hard shell that rigidly separates American individuals. If, as in Hamaguchi’s scheme, the Japanese sense of self includes the context of relationships, "who is 'I' and who is 'you' is not defined absolutely, but is always being redefined according to the nature of 'I' and 'you' relations" (Hamaguchi 1985:302, 303).

The desire for unity, not autonomy, is more likely to stir the emotions of the Japanese. According to Okonogi, "In any Japanese movie or play, the most moving and climactic scenes are those depicting the mutual confirmation of this sense of unity" (Okonogi 1978:99). Group unity in Japan is reinforced by the indulgence in dependency relationships represented by amae. Amae refers to a
deeply felt need to be treated warmly and affectionately within the
protected limits of important relationships. Rather than denounce
the emotional dependency inherent in *amae*, Japanese cultural pat-
terns encourage it. Doi asserts that *amae* “requires the presence of
others: it may make the individual dependent on the group; but it
will never allow him to be independent of it in the true sense” (Doi

Indulging *amae* and emphasizing interdependency does not ne-
gate competition. The contrasting nature of competition in the two
societies reflects the Japanese emphasis on belonging and group-ori-
ented behavior versus the Western ideal of individualism. Both Ja-
pan and the United States can be thought of as highly competitive
countries, but the locus of competition is quite different. In the
United States, people compete to “stand out” from others, or to “get
ahead” of others. Japanese-style competition often goes unrecog-
nized by Westerners, but Kumon asserts that “the Japanese are en-
gaged in keen competition” (Kumon 1982:26). Kumon character-
izes Japanese competition as *yokonarabi* (meaning to “line up side-
ways”) competition. There is no emphasis on getting ahead, stand-
ing out, or doing better than others. Instead, emphasis is on not
falling behind the others (Kumon 1982:27).

An emphasis on shame sanctions is consistent with the high value
the Japanese place on group-oriented cooperative action as opposed
to independence and individuality. Shame, possibly evidenced by
its emergence during the bonding stage, is more profoundly associ-
ated with the fear that one’s inadequacies will result in the loss of
union or expulsion from the group. Piers describes the fear of dis-
union, which is the essence of shame.

Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt
which, on an even deeper level of the unconscious, spells fear of abandonment. . . .
on a higher, social and more conscious level of individual development, it is again
not fear of active punishment by superiors which is implied in shame anxiety, but
social expulsion, like ostracism. [Piers and Singer 1967:16]

Shame is a more effective sanction in a society where rejection or
ostracism from the group generates a greater anxiety than the fear
of punishment.8 The connection between shame and belongingness
is so strong in Japan that Doi claims to even act independently of
the group may invoke shame.

It is extremely difficult for a Japanese to transcend the group and act indepen-
dently. The reason would seem to be that a Japanese feels vaguely that it is treach-
erous to act on his own without considering the feelings of the group to which he belongs, and feels ashamed even, at doing something on his own. [Doi 1973:54]

Shame, with its corresponding fear of rejection, is not a very effective sanction in American society, where individuals are encouraged to become independent. The American value system emphasizes self-reliance and repudiates dependency. As affirmed by Hsu, the American core value is "self-reliance, the most persistent psychological expression of which is the fear of dependence" (Hsu 1961:217). It seems likely that a culture which stresses autonomy and individuality would instead place more emphasis on the oedipal stage of development, that stage associated with the task of separation, the development of a concept of individual self-identity, and the emergence of guilt.

The varying emphasis on shame and guilt sanctions in the two cultures is also related to the relative value placed on the expression of individual freedom. Given the American emphasis on individual freedom, people are, ideally, allowed to do anything as long as they do not commit a "wrong" act. Since guilt results from transgressing a negative limit, it is a more logical sanction. Japanese culture places higher value on the harmonious interaction of group members than on individual freedom. Emphasis on shaping the self to a certain context of social relationships necessitates doing something "right," making shame a more logical sanction in the Japanese context.

**Absolute versus Situational Ethics**

An emphasis on shame sanctions would also be consistent with the Japanese world view and its corresponding emphasis on situational ethics. Influenced by certain Judeo-Christian beliefs, traditional Western discipline has been concerned with conquering the evil tendencies in individual people. A concern with inherent evil would result in an emphasis on guilt sanctions to restrain that evil. Common Western interpretations of the superego/ego/id triad echo the theme of "inherent evil" by suggesting that beneath the apparent goodness and moral order of society the forces of the id—held in check only by the superego—lurk like monsters waiting to wreak devastation. According to such a view, human beings do not have to be socially prompted to act because the forces of the id continually urge them to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Left unrestrained, the
urges of the id could potentially lead to social disintegration. Therefore, the superego assists the ego in establishing and maintaining limits that the id should not transgress.

According to the prevailing Japanese notion, human impulses are basically good or neutral and the concern is to channel these impulses into appropriate group-oriented behavior. An analogy the Japanese commonly use to portray basic human nature asserts that human beings are like string. There is nothing inherently bad about a massive amount of string, but in order for it to be useful it should be wound into a desirable shape—a ball. Japanese culture does not emphasize restraining the inherent evil basic to human nature, but rather shaping human beings into a socially desirable form. This requires a sense of shame prompting the individual toward a positive ego-ideal.

It is possible to state metaphorically that depending on the culture one belongs to morals are incarnated either as “God” or as “Group.” Americans are more likely to view morality in absolute terms based on principles of right and wrong that are not considered to vary with the situation. Japanese morality tends to judge the value of an act in a situational context based on its impact on significant relationships. Minami Hiroshi (1953, 1980) emphasized the central role of giri (duty, obligation) in defining Japanese ethics. He portrays giri as a code of behavior that defines the relationships between people and according to which proper behavior varies with each circumstance, depending on the relationship of those involved.

It is difficult to operationally define guilt in a world view governed by situational ethics. Since an action may be good or bad depending on the situation, it is impossible to define a “negative behavior” except in an extremely abstract sense; “bad is bad when it is bad.” The Japanese seldom speak of “sin,” but instead apologize for what they call a machigai, which literally means a “misplacement in context.” The moral “goal” in Japanese society is to become a jinsei no tatsuji, “master of life,” which is a person who never errs in judging the right behavior at any particular moment, given the particular situation.10

One cannot argue that people who have internalized a particularistic morality cannot have consciences or do not feel guilt at doing something they believe to be wrong. Given this type of morality, however, it seems probable that feelings of shame over failure to live
up to the expectations of specified role relationships, upon which high positive value is always placed, would outweigh feelings of guilt at having committed an act that sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a transgression of moral boundaries. Minami claims that at the heart of *giri* (based on the meaning of *gi*) is the obligation to behave properly, having grasped the way one is supposed to be (*jibun no aru-bekiyo*) (Minami 1953:197).11

**CHILD-REARING AND SOCIALIZATION PRACTICES**

Child-rearing and socialization practices in Japan are more likely to give rise to the development of shame. DeVos points out that prevailing child-rearing practices in Japan emphasize "social evaluation as a sanction, rather than the more internalized, self-contained ethical codes instilled and enforced early by parental punishment" (1973:145, 146). In Japan, physical punishment is seldom resorted to; instead the child is ridiculed or subjected to embarrassment (Lebra 1976:152). The recognition of inadequacy is emphasized rather than the transgression of wrong (DeVos 1973:146). Despite the decreasing acceptance of (or perhaps more correctly, the cyclical popularity of) physical punishment in the United States, discipline still emphasizes the transgression of negative limits. Restricting them to their room (grounding) or denying normal privileges are common forms of discipline for older children, "time-outs" an accepted form of discipline for younger children. In either case, the grounding or time-out encourages those involved to contemplate why their actions were "wrong."

Many authors point out that Japanese mothers may not "go head on against the child" (Befu 1971:156; Vogel 1963:245) but must instead induce the child to behave properly. Although Japanese mothers are unlikely to physically punish their children, they do employ a powerful means of sanctioning behavior. This takes a form that may be called "maternal ostracism." The mother pretends the child is no longer present, walks off, ignores any response the child may have, and through her behavior absolutely denies the child's existence. In my four years of residing and conducting research in Japan I witnessed this drama on innumerable occasions in a diversity of locations, in my own residential neighborhood as well as in the restaurants, shopping centers, and other public places where I conducted my research. While this ostracism goes on, the child usually screams, cries, and appears desperately distraught. In many cases
the mother will return home, locking a child outside of the house or apartment, where it will remain, screaming "Okaasan, Okaasan" ("Mommy, Mommy"). Since the child is defined as "nonexistent," the mother is not really locking anyone out.

Each form of behavioral sanctioning (punishment, including grounding, time-out, or maternal ostracism) is accepted by one culture, denounced by the other. Japanese tend to think Western punishment is horribly cruel. Vogel notes that "Japanese mothers, visiting the United States, have expressed their shock at the cruelty and crudity of American mothers who spank or yell at their children" (Vogel 1963:244). Many Westerners living in Japan have mentioned to me that they consider the maternal denial described above to be exceptionally cruel. However, each type of sanction is consistent with other cultural patterns. In each case the chosen sanction "hurts" because it corresponds to the value placed either on individualism or on interdependency. The painful message that Western parents convey to their children, whether byspanking them, grounding them, or denying other privileges, is that they are still not independent or autonomous yet. The threat behind maternal ostracism is abandonment, the same threat that Piers describes as the essence of shame. The painful message Japanese mothers give their children is that they are not absolutely at union, they still risk rejection or abandonment.

Other child-rearing practices also reveal the difference in value placed on individualism. A research study by Caudill and Weinstein concludes that by three to four months of age infants in Japan and America have incorporated different and culturally appropriate forms of behavior and that these forms of behavior are consistent with later social expectations. Caudill and Weinstein characterize the different cultural conceptions of the infant in the following way:

In Japan, the infant is seen as a separate biological organism who from the beginning, in order to develop, needs to be drawn into increasingly interdependent relations with others. In America, the infant is seen more as a dependent biological organism who, in order to develop, needs to be made increasingly independent of others. [Caudill and Weinstein 1974:229]

Or, one could argue that in Japan emphasis is placed on the pre-oedipal or bonding stage—the stage at which shame develops—whereas in the United States emphasis is placed on the oedipal, or separation stage—the stage at which guilt develops.
This difference may clearly be seen in culturally defined appropriate sleeping arrangements encouraged from earliest infancy. Japanese children will normally sleep in the same room with their parents and any other siblings until around 12 years of age.\textsuperscript{12} This sleeping arrangement is considered desirable and does not result from space limitations; it is as much the practice in rural areas where large houses are common as in urban apartment complexes. Many urban dwellers aspire to have apartments large enough for each child to have his or her own room. However, these are not considered "bedrooms" in the Western sense. They are designated as study rooms, and children still sleep in the same room as their parents. Sleeping together promotes a sense of group identification. Children learn to feel emotionally secure when other members of their group are present. Vogel explains that in Japan it is assumed that the child will naturally want to be close to his mother and will be afraid to be alone. The mother deals with such fears not by assuring the child that there is nothing to be afraid of, but by remaining with him. The implicit attitude seems to be that the mother agrees that the outside is frightening, but that while she is there she will protect the child against all outside dangers. [Vogel 1963:233]

In contrast, American pediatricians recommend that children learn to sleep alone, preferably in a separate room, as soon as they arrive home from the hospital. Sleeping alone is considered essential to the development of an autonomous, self-reliant individual. This attitude is clearly evident in the following excerpt from a guidebook written by the Director of the Center for Pediatric Sleep Disorders at Children's Hospital in Boston.

We know for a fact that people sleep better alone in bed. . . . But there are even better reasons for your child to sleep in his own bed. Sleeping alone is an important part of his learning to be able to separate from you without anxiety and to see himself as an independent individual. This process is important to his early psychological development. . . . If you take the easy way out and allow your child into your bed while one of you moves into his, your child will certainly not be reassured. . . . If you find that you actually prefer to have your child in your bed, you should examine your own feelings very carefully. [Ferber 1985:38, 39]

The goal of psychological development in the American context is an "independent individual." Children who do not learn to sleep alone may fail to attain this state. Parents who do not insist that their children sleep alone are suspected of having failed to adequately achieve this state themselves. Let us contrast the above ci-
tation with what the Japanese "know for a fact" about sleeping behavior, as indicated by Befu.

When the parents retire at night, at least one of them normally sleeps in the same quilt in the child's infancy and in an adjoining one later on. Thus Japanese infants and children tend not to experience the sense of insecurity arising from being left alone, and the Japanese mother is a much more reliable source of emotional satisfaction and less a cause of potential insecurity (by leaving him alone) than the American mother. [Befu 1971:155]

The goal of psychological development in the Japanese context is interdependency. The initial emphasis on interdependent unity with the mother is later transferred to the membership group to which the person belongs. Vogel notes that "there is a continuity and compatibility between the child's dependence on his immediate family and the dependence which he later feels toward his school and work groups" (Vogel 1963:235).

Japanese society values harmony and group-oriented cohesiveness. There is a functional fit between these ideals of the social order and an emphasis on unity, interdependency, and shame sanctions in individual development. American society values independence and individual initiative with a corresponding emphasis on the development of autonomy, self-reliance, and guilt sanctions. Each culture gains something through its respective emphasis; it gains greater cultural cohesion and a sense of integration between the individual psyche and the larger social order. It is also quite possible that each pays a price for its sense of integrity. In Japan the comfort of belongingness may be purchased through the acceptance of limitations on individual independence. Regarding the Japanese individual, Nakane claims that "Within his group he is secure but his security is maintained at the expense of his individual autonomy" (Nakane 1970:121). In American society the emphasis on self-reliance and its underlying fear of dependency leads to a conflict-ridden enigma, since "the very foundation of the human way of life is man's dependence upon his fellow men" (Hsu 1961:219). The American's gain in individual autonomy is bought, perhaps, at the cost of denying the pain of separation.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has discussed concerns pertinent to the distinction between shame and guilt, a distinction I believe has potential heuristic
benefit to the study of culture. The problems of distinguishing between shame and guilt have led some to advise that the distinction is inapplicable for social research. However, the distinction is one that is recognized even at the level of popular culture. In a Hank Williams popular hit the frustrated singer, pointing out his lover's failure to respond to her own inadequacies, accuses: "You have no heart, you have no shame." He also admits to being guilty of the "great sin" of trusting her—something he should not do (Williams 1952). Although I must admit that Mr. Williams may have been more interested in the rhyming capabilities of shame and guilt than in their role in psychosocial development or their potential heuristic benefits to intercultural research, these lyrics suggest three relevant points, which together may be remembered as a model for the shame-and-guilt dichotomy. These are: that the two affects are commonly differentiated and can vary independently; that shame is something which should accompany the failure to live up to a positive image, whereas guilt results from committing a negative act; and that the individual absolutely lacking in either is somehow incomplete.

More relevant than differentiating between guilt and shame is the possibility that the relative presence or absence of either sanction may be related to variations in world view, cultural values, or mechanisms of social control. Guilt does exist in Japanese society, but the heavy emphasis placed on being accepted by a group and living up to positive ideals of behavior defined by one's personal relationships and status within a group indicates that shame may be a stronger motivation for Japanese behavior. Doi nicely sums up the relationship between guilt and shame in Japanese society stating, "just as betrayal of the group creates guilt, so to be ostracized by the group is the greatest shame and dishonor. For this reason to have a sense of shame is extremely important for someone belonging to a group" (1973:53).

I do not think that designations of "shame culture" or "guilt culture" should be thought of in pejorative terms. They do, however, raise the question of whether issues that might potentially be considered pejorative should be avoided in social science research. Perhaps anticipating the criticism her analysis would inspire, Benedict wrote that being an anthropologist "requires both a certain tough-mindedness and a certain generosity. It requires a tough-minded-
ness which people of good will have sometimes condemned" (Ben-
edict 1946:14). To label Japan a "shame culture" or the United
States a "guilt culture" may merely be caricature. Anthropologi-
cal description, with its emphasis on determining general patterns
and its reliance on modal or ideal types that never correspond ab-
solutely to the more complex real social system or the idiosyncratic
variation among individual participants of a culture, may often be
nothing more than caricature. There is both a danger and a validity
to caricature. A good caricature, by exposing the prominent fea-
tures, captures its model and helps to communicate an understand-
ing of it to others. It is inappropriate to present caricature as, or to
suggest that a caricature is, indicative of all the subtle variations and
specific diversions present in reality.

I felt the need to defend "Ruthless Benedict" from the prevalent
criticisms regarding her "cultural prejudices" and "creeping value
judgments." Although there are problems with her conceptual
framework, I do not think the above criticisms are appropriate.
Everyone seems to have something to say about the cultural preju-
dices that enter Benedict's assessment of internal-versus-external
sanctions, shame versus guilt, and differences in Japanese and
American cultural patterns in general. I wanted to add my opinion
regarding what I thought Benedict was trying to say about the dif-
ferences between cultures integrated through a relative emphasis on
shame and those integrated through a relative emphasis on guilt. As
she herself explained:

I do not know why believing in the brotherhood of man should mean that one can-
not say that the Japanese have their version of the conduct of life and that Ameri-
cans have theirs. . . . to demand such uniformity as a condition of respecting an-
other nation is as neurotic as to demand it of one's wife or one's children. The
tough-minded are content that differences should exist. They respect the differ-
ences. [Benedict 1946:14]

NOTES

Acknowledgments. I want to thank Drs. Shumpei Kumon, David Spain, and Susan Hanley
for their comments on earlier versions of this article, Masahisa Kagami for research assis-
tance, and Elizabeth Moravec for graphic assistance.

1Lebra also points out that the potency of shame sanctions, particularly in cases of recog-
nized status incongruity, is likely to be greater in social settings where "gemeinschaft" pre-
dominates, and suggests that this may have also led to the association of shame sanctions with
more "primitive" forms of social organization. She writes:
The ideal situation where mutual status identification among actors is maximized, then, is found in a Gemeinschaft where everyone knows everyone else. This may have led some authors on the subject of guilt and shame to associate shame with an earlier stage of socio-evolutionary development than guilt. [Lebra 1971:247]

2The book being reviewed (BenDasan 1970) sparked a great deal of controversy in its own right. It was generally considered a favorable analysis of Japanese culture but was criticized as not being "relativistic" in its treatment of Jews. There was also a great deal of mystery surrounding the author. The author was believed to be Japanese and to have used a pen name that would suggest a person of Middle Eastern heritage. Criticisms of the book, the author, and the intentions behind the book, point out that even the pen name suggests a ridiculing contempt for non-Japanese. "BenDasan" creates a pun, the essence of which in colloquial Japanese is, "Let's shit."

3After this paper was written and accepted for publication, a book was published by Clifford Geertz, entitled Works and Lives (1988), which deals extensively with the anthropological contributions of Ruth Benedict. Although I do not want to revise this article to address works that have been published since it was written, I have asked to insert this note regarding Geertz's treatment of Benedict. I believe that Geertz's analysis of Benedict meshes nicely with what I have tried to convey here. Geertz emphasizes the fact that Benedict's ethnographic account of the Japanese in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was primarily a means of critiquing (and criticizing) American society, an attempt to urge Americans to question their own domestic assumptions. The reactions of Japanese scholars and some of the Japan specialists discussed in this article reveal that this has largely not been the understanding of Benedict's work by Japanese or Japan specialists. Although Geertz has now provided us with an in-depth analysis of Benedict's "work and life," his analysis is directed largely at her contributions as they are perceived or interpreted in the world of anthropology. As both an anthropologist and a Japan specialist I have often felt that there is a sharp contrast between these two fields regarding the perception of Benedict and her work. This article reflects, in part, an attempt to bridge this schism separating the Benedict anthropologists discuss from the Benedict dealt with by Japanologists.

4One possible indication of Western bias in psychoanalytic theory is the fact that the oedipal phase is designated by its own term in contrast to the linguistically unmarked "pre-oedipal" phase.

5In stating his criticisms of Benedict, Sakuta—in contrast to DeVos—did not reject the premise that Japan was a shame culture but rather Benedict's definitions of a shame culture. He wrote:

I think [Benedict] did well in "spotlighting" Japanese characteristics... my criticism is not of her methods, but that the configuration drawn by her does not cover all aspects of Japan's "shame" culture... Benedict concentrated too much on public shame. Public shame is only one case of shame, although I admit it is a very conspicuous type of shame it does not cover the entire reality of shame... in other words, a more fundamental understanding of hagi is necessary. [Sakuta 1967:10]

6In a subsequent analysis of Sakuta's work Hamaguchi also points out that shuchii functionally resembles "guilt" and is hence often misinterpreted as guilt (Hamaguchi 1982:63). This again suggests the possibility that at least certain of the instances described by DeVos as guilt resulting from the "capacity to hurt by failing to carry out an obligation" may be defined by the Japanese scholars mentioned here as that internalized form of shame resembling guilt Sakuta designated as shuchii. DeVos aptly documented reactions among Japanese that would likely be interpreted both by Western and Japanese scholars as guilt. However, his argument that guilt among Japanese results from a failure to achieve positive goals may be a matter of interpretation. It seems quite possible that "nullification of parental expectations" (DeVos
1973:148) may in the Japanese case constitute not just the failure to attain a positive ego-ideal but the transgression of a negative limit.

Hamaguchi contends that Benedict’s comparison of Oriental and Occidental cultures is misguided because it is based on the belief that an individual is an autonomous unit of action (1985:282), taking as its point of reference the assumption that “the individual is a free and independent being” (1985:293). I am not convinced Benedict asserts such a fixed notion of an “individual.” Like Hamaguchi, she seems to perceive the possibility that the Japanese have a very different self-concept. Hence, she is able to make the following assessment of the debtor/benefactor association involved in relationships of on (obligation). She writes, “This is the clue to Japanese reactions to on. They can be borne, with whatever mixed feelings, so long as the ‘on man’ is actually oneself” (1946:109).

It is relevant that in Shame Culture Reconsidered, Sakuta devotes extensive discussion to the relationship between shame and loneliness. Sections focusing on Japan highlight the fear of loneliness, as evidenced by such titles as “Shame and Loneliness,” “Various Forms of Loneliness,” and “Loneliness among the Masses.” Discussing the pervasiveness of shame as a self-punishing sanction and the fear of loneliness, Sakuta writes:

There is certainly no one, who has not ever experienced loneliness. Even a two or three year old toddler understands well the sadness, the pain of not having his or her feelings understood, or of being ignored. In short, the loneliness that anyone experiences is a state of mind arising from the condition of uncommunicability to others, especially when they have grave significance to you, or in cases of not being loved or respected. [Sakuta 1967:27]

Although DeVos argues that the Japanese achievement drive is motivated by a sense of guilt, Sakuta’s writings point toward shame and the fear of loneliness as motivations for achievement. He writes:

The son who fails in his entrance examinations, those who return to their home town without success, the company worker who turns out to be worthless, in these cases the primary people they interact with—family, neighbors, colleagues—tend to lessen communication thereby deepening their solitude. [Sakuta 1967:40, 41]

When Sakuta’s analysis shifts to Western cultures the focus on loneliness is transformed into a focus on “sin and salvation.”

It is not my intention here to enter the debate about whether Freud perceived the world in this way. That many authors have discussed the superego/ego/id triad on these terms suggests, at least, a projection of Western philosophical views onto the personality model. This provides evidence that the prevailing Western world view posits “inherent evil” as the basic nature of mankind.

I am indebted to Dr. Shumpei Kumon for pointing out the relevancy of both examples used in this paragraph.

Whereas Lebra asserts a primacy of Japanese guilt (1983:206, 207), suggested by such guilt responses in TAT studies as sumanai or moshiwakenai (Lebra 1983:203), Minami asserts that moshiwakenai (guilt), although present and perhaps conspicuous, is a subsidiary category to arubekiyo (the way one is supposed to be) (Minami 1953:197).

According to the common pattern, children in Japan either sleep with their parents on the same futon (sleeping mats placed on the floor), or on contiguous futon. For families that use futon, this situation can be thought of as “sleeping in the same bed.” Many families in contemporary Japan have adopted Western-style beds. Families that use beds have a greater tendency to assume independent sleeping arrangements.

The idea that “caricature” could be used as an analogy to explain the nature of anthropological inquiry was proposed to me by Dr. David Spain.
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